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Abstract
In Stackelberg security games, information about the attacker’s type (i.e., payoff parameters) are
essential for computing the optimal strategy for the defender to commit to. While such information
can be incomplete or uncertain in practice, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal
defender commitment from the attacker’s best responses during the defender’s interaction with the
follower. In this paper, we show that, however, such algorithms might be easily manipulated by a
strategic attacker, who intentionally sends fake best responses to mislead the learning algorithm into
producing a strategy that benefits the attacker but, very likely, hurts the defender. As a key finding in
this paper, attacker manipulation normally leads to the defender playing only her maximin strategy,
which effectively renders the learning algorithm useless as to compute the maximin strategy requires
no information about the other player at all. To address this issue, we propose a game-theoretic
framework at a higher level, in which the defender commits to a policy that allows her to specify a
particular strategy to play conditioned on the learned attacker type. We then provide a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute the optimal defender policy, and in addition, a heuristic approach that
applies even when the attacker type space is infinite or completely unknown. It is shown through
simulations that our approaches can improve in the defender’s utility significantly as compared to
the situation when attacker manipulations are ignored.
1 Introduction
Stackelberg security games (SSGs) are Stackelberg game models that are used to derive optimal strate-
gies of security resource allocation in the face of strategic adversaries. In the AI community, the line
of works applying SSG models has achieved many high-impact goals in the past decade, providing
algorithms for systems in use by the US Transportation Security Administration, the Los Angeles Air-
port, the US Cost Guard, the Federal Air Marshal Service, to assist with the protection of high-profile
infrastructures, and public and natural resources [Tambe, 2011].
The standard solution concept of SSG, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) captures the situ-
ation where a defender (the leader) commits to her optimal strategy, assuming that an attacker (the fol-
lower) will respond optimally to her commitment. Algorithms have been developed (for the defender)
to compute SSEs in different models when complete information about the attacker’s type (i.e., his pay-
off parameters) is provided. While such information may be incomplete in many real environments,
approaches have also been proposed for the defender to learn the optimal commitment through interact-
ing with the attacker: by committing to a series of carefully chosen defender strategies and observing
the attacker’s best responses to these strategies [Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Haghtalab et
al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2019]. The optimality of the learned commitment thus relies
∗Jiarui Gan was supported by the EPSRC International Doctoral Scholars Grant EP/N509711/1.
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crucially on the assumption of a truthful attacker, who responds optimally to queries of the learning
algorithms according to his actual payoffs. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the attacker will
indeed behave truthfully. A strategic attacker can tamper the defender’s learning algorithm by sending
fake best responses to its queries, typically by imitating the responses of a different attacker type; the
defender will learn an optimal commitment but against the imitated type as a result, which is likely to
be suboptimal against the actual attacker type.
As we show in this paper, the attacker has strong incentives to manipulate the defender’s learning
algorithm. The adversarial nature of SSGs also gives rise to a surprising key finding of this paper,
that a manipulative attacker would be incentivized to imitate a type that makes the game zero-sum. A
credulous defender would then learn only her maximin strategy (which is exactly the SSE strategy in
a zero-sum game), which effectively renders the whole learning process meaningless as computing the
maximin strategy requires no information about the other player’s payoff parameters at all!
Motivated by this issue, we study what a defender can do to reduce her loss due to such manipu-
lations. We put forward a game-theoretic framework at a higher level, in which the defender commits
to a policy that allows her to specify a strategy to play conditioned on the learned information. The
framework generalizes the playbook of the defender in the current SSG model, where she always plays
the SSE strategy she learns. A strategic attacker then takes into account the defender’s policy, choos-
ing optimally what he wants the defender to learn so that the defender’s policy outputs a strategy that
benefits him the most.
Under this framework, we make several other contributions. (i) We propose a reasonable measure of
the quality of a policy. (ii) We then develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy
with respect to the proposed measure. (iii) In addition, we also provide a heuristic approach which
applies to an infinite or even unknown space of attacker types; the approach is inspired by the quantal
response model and reveals the rationality of behaving in a boundedly rational manner in the presence of
a manipulative attacker. (iv) It is shown through simulations that our approaches can improvement in the
defender’s utility significantly in randomly generated games as compared to the situation when attacker
manipulations are ignored. It is worth noting that, though our work is based on the specific security
game model, the framework we propose also applies to general Stackelberg games that have a wider
range of applications. The SSG model offers us an appropriate level of specification that enables us to
derive a richer set of results than from a more general model — consider, e.g., when the interests of the
leader and the follower completely align, there is simply no incentive for the follower to manipulate the
leader — while it also captures sufficiently many real-world applications of significant practical value.
Additional Related Work Manipulation of the defender’s (leader’s) learning algorithm remains an
unexplored area in the literature, though there are many papers focusing on designing the learning algo-
rithms. In addition to the aforementioned works on learning from the attacker’s best responses [Letch-
ford et al., 2009; Blum et al., 2014; Haghtalab et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2019], a couple
of papers also take the regret-minimization approach and design online learning algorithms for the de-
fender to play in a repeated game [Balcan et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2016]. Our work takes a middle-ground
approach between the overoptimistic assumption of a truthful attacker adopted by the former works, and
the pessimistic assumption of a worst-case non-strategic opponent by the latter.
Our work is related to poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning, where an attacker manip-
ulates the training data (in our model, their payoffs) to undermine the performance of learning algo-
rithms [Dalvi et al., 2004; Barreno et al., 2010; Biggio et al., 2012; Li et al., 2016; Steinhardt et al.,
2017]. In a broader sense, handling manipulation can also be seen as playing against information uncer-
tainty. For Stackelberg games, algorithms have been designed to compute robust leader strategies when
the leader can estimate the follower’s payoffs within a certain interval [Letchford et al., 2009; Kiek-
intveld et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014], or has probabilistic belief about the follower’s types [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2006; Paruchuri et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2009]. Unlike in our model,
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it is assumed that the attacker (follower) is essentially truthful and will not strategically make use of
information uncertainty to manipulate the defender/leader in these models.
2 SSG Preliminaries
An SSG is played between a defender (the leader) and an attacker (the follower). The defender allocates
m security resources to a set of targets T = {1, . . . , n} (n > m), and the attacker wants to attack the
targets. In the pure strategy setting, a defender strategy is a resource allocation. An attack on a target i
is unsuccessful as long as one resource is allocated to i, in which case the attacker receives a penalty pai ,
and the defender a reward rdi . Conversely, an attack on target i is successful if no resource is allocated
to i, in which case the attacker receives a reward rai , and the defender a penalty p
d
i . It is assumed that
rai > p
a
i and r
d
i > p
d
i for all i ∈ T , in the sense that the attacker always prefers a successful attack, and
the defender prefers the opposite.
More generally, the defender can commit to a mixed strategy (i.e., a probability distribution of
pure strategies), from which she samples a pure strategy to play. By the standard assumption, the
attacker is now able to observe the defender’s mixed strategy through surveillance but not the instantiated
pure strategy. A defender mixed strategy can be represented more compactly as a coverage (vector)
c = (ci)i∈T , with each ci representing the probability that target i is protected. We will stick to this
representation in the paper and use the terms coverage and defender mixed strategy interchangeably.
Under the constraint that the defender can use at most m resources in a pure strategy, the space of
feasible mixed strategies is C = {c ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1,
∑
i∈T ci ≤ m}; any coverage vector in C
can be implemented as a distribution of pure strategies each involving at most m resources, and any
such distribution results in a coverage vector in C. Let ud(c, i) and ua(c, i) be the expected utilities of
the defender and the attacker, respectively, when the defender plays a mixed strategy c and the attacker
attacks target i. With slight abuse of notation, we write
ud(c, i) = ud(ci, i) = ci · r
d
i + (1− ci) · p
d
i , (1)
ua(c, i) = ua(ci, i) = (1− ci) · r
a
i + ci · p
a
i . (2)
It is worth noting that the defender’s utility function is strictly increasing with respect to ci, and attacker’s
utility function strictly decreasing.
The strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of SSGs. In an SSE, the
defender plays an optimal mixed strategy, accounting that the attacker always responds optimally with
a pure strategy after observing the defender’s strategy; ties are assumed to be broken in favor of the
defender when the attacker has multiple optimal choices, and this assumption is justified by the fact that
the defender can normally induce strict preference of the attacker by reducing protection to her favored
target by an infinitesimal amount.1 Formally, a strategy profile (cˆ, iˆ) forms an SSE if:
(cˆ, iˆ) ∈ argmax
c∈C,i∈BR(c) u
d(c, i),
where BR(c) is the attacker’s best response set, the set of best responses to c, i.e.,
BR(c) = argmaxi∈T u
a(c, i).
An SSE always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, e.g., using a multiple-LP approach [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2006].
In this paper, we will refer to a set of attacker payoff parameters (ra,pa) as the attacker’s type. To
distinguish, we extend Eq. (2) and denote by uaθ the utility function of an attacker of type θ, i.e., for
1See [Stengel and Zamir, 2004] and [Tambe, 2011] (Chapter 8) for more discussions on the SSG and the solution concepts.
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θ = (r,p), we have uaθ(c, i) = (1 − ci) · ri + ci · pi. Definition of the best response set is extended
similarly, i.e., BRθ(c) = argmaxi∈T u
a
θ(c, i). We will refer to an SSE in a game where the attacker has
(true) type θ an SSE on attacker type θ.
Example 1. Consider an SSG where the defender allocates one security guard to protect two targets A
andB. Thus, the defender has three pure strategies: assigning the guard to protect A orB, or sending the
guard on vacation; the corresponding mixed strategy space is C = {c ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, c1 + c2 ≤ 1}.
The attacker can choose to attack A or B. The targets are of equal importance to the defender, such
that a successful attack on either target i ∈ {A,B} results in utility pdi = −1 for the defender, and an
unsuccessful one results in rdi = 0. For the attacker, the payoffs are r
a
A = 1, r
a
B = 3, and p
a
A = p
a
B = 0.
The bi-matrix representation of the game is shown below, with the defender and the attacker being the
row and column players, respectively.
attack A attack B
protect A 0, 0 -1, 1
protect B -1, 3 0, 0
protect ∅ -1, 3 -1, 1
The SSE of this game can be found using the indifference
rule, i.e., by identifying a point where the attacker is indifferent of
attacking A and B, while the defender cannot improve coverage
of the targets any further (however, not in every game can an
SSE be found in this way). In the only SSE of this game, the
defender protects (A,B) with probabilities cˆ = (3/4, 1/4) (which is equivalent to a mixed strategy
x = (3/4, 1/4, 0) as in the bi-matrix representation), by which the attacker finds his best response set
to be BR(cˆ) = {A,B}, so by the SSE tie-breaking assumption, responds in favor of the defender by
attacking A. The defender gets utility ud(cˆ, A) = −1/4 and the attacker gets ua(cˆ, A) = 3/4.
3 Manipulating a Learning Defender
We investigate how a strategic attacker can manipulate the defender’s learning algorithm. We begin with
a warm-up example of an attacker manipulation below.
Example 2. Consider now the attacker in Example 1 plays a trick, pretending to have payoff raA = 1 (all
other parameters remain the same) and “best” responding to queries of the defender’s learning algorithm
according to this fake parameter. Let the fake attacker type be β. The defender will be quietly misled
into learning an SSE strategy against β, which is c˜ = (1/2, 1/2). Now that BRβ(c˜) = {A,B}, the
attacker then responds (still in favor of the defender) by attacking A, resulting in his utility to increase
to 3/2 for the attacker, but the defender’s utility to drop to −1/2. There is a loss of 1/4 in the defender’s
utility compared to the truthful case!
Observe that in the above example, the attacker actually convinces the defender to play a zero-sum
game with him. Interestingly, it turns out that this is not a coincidence but a general phenomenon in
SSGs. We will show next that it is optimal for the attacker to mislead the defender into learning only her
maximin strategy, which is exactly her SSE strategy in a zero-sum game.
3.1 Optimal Report of the Attacker
A couple of “disclaimers” would be appropriate before our analysis: First, we only focus on the players’
utilities in the final realization stage of the game, i.e., in the fake SSE the defender learns. The cost for
the players in the learning process is omitted as we expect the learning algorithms to be efficient and the
subsequent play in the learned SSE to repeat in a sufficiently long period; this simplification is in line
with previous works on designing learning algorithms for the defender/leader (e.g., [Letchford et al.,
2009; Blum et al., 2014; Peng et al., 2019]). Without loss of generality, we view the learning process as
a reporting step in which the attacker simply reports his payoff parameters to the defender.
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Second, we assume that the attacker’s behavior conforms to the reported type throughout the game.
This means that the attacker may be playing a suboptimal response in the fake SSE in the realization
stage of the game. Although this also means that the attacker may now exploit the defender for an even
higher utility by switching back to his true best response, since such behavior change will inevitably
make the defender aware of the manipulation and introduce further complication to our model, we adopt
this cleaner modeling approach to capture the essence of the manipulation problem, which also makes
the model more amenable for formal analysis.
The following program computes the optimal reporting strategy of an attacker of true type θ.
maxβ, cˆ, iˆ u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ) (3)
s.t. (cˆ, iˆ) ∈ argmax
c∈C,i∈BRβ(c) u
d(c, i) (3a)
β ∈ Θ (3b)
where Θ = {(r,p) ∈ Rn×n : ri > pi for all i ∈ T} is the set of types that adhere to the basic
assumption that an attacker always prefers a successful attack (we will also show a stronger result that
allows for more strict specifications of Θ). In the program, the attacker reports a fake type β that results
in the defender to learn a strategy cˆ which, by (3a), forms an SSE (on attacker type β) along with a
best response iˆ (of type β). An optimal solution thus yields a reporting strategy for the attacker, that
maximizes his true utility uaθ.
Based on the program, our next key result Theorem 3 reveals that it is always optimal for the attacker
to mislead the defender into playing her maximin strategy. This is surprising as the defender essentially
learns no information: to obtain the maximin strategy requires no knowledge about the other player’s
payoffs at all!
Theorem 3. There exists an optimal solution (β, z, t) of Program (3) such that z is a maximin strategy
of the defender, i.e., z ∈ argmaxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i).
Proof. Let c ∈ argmaxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i) be a maximin strategy of the defender, and we let u =
maxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i) = mini∈T u
d(c, i) be the corresponding maximin utility. Consider a solution
(β, z, t) such that:
• zi = max
{
0,
u−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
}
for all i ∈ T ;
• t ∈ BRθ(z) is an arbitrary best response of the attacker (whose true type is θ);
• β = (r,p) is such that ri =
{
−pdi , if i 6= t
−min{pdt , u}, otherwise
, and pi = −r
d
i for all i ∈ T .
We show that z is a maximin defender strategy, (β, z, t) is a feasible solution and it is optimal. Below
are two observations about (β, z, t).
(i) For all i 6= t, the payoffs defined by r and p are exactly the negative of the defender’s payoffs;
thus, uaβ(c, i) = −u
d(c, i) for any c ∈ C. This does not hold for i = t, but given that rt =
−min{pdt , u}, we have u
a
β(c, t) = (1−ct) ·rt+ct ·pt ≥ (1−ct) ·(−p
d
t )+ct ·(−r
d
t ) = −u
d(c, t).
(ii) For all i ∈ T , since zi = max
{
0,
u−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
}
, we have ud(z, i) ≥ ud
(
u−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
, i
)
=
u−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
· rdi +(
1−
u−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
)
· pdi = u; and in particular, u
d(z, i) = u if zi > 0. Thus, mini∈T u
d(z, i) ≥ u =
maxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i), so z is indeed a maximin strategy.
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Feasibility First, (β, z, t) satisfies (3b) because ri ≥ −p
d
i > −r
d
i = pi for all i ∈ T . To see that it also
satisfies (3a), observe that
uaβ(z, t) = u
a
β(zt, t) =
{
uaβ
(
u−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
, t
)
=
(
1−
u−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
)
· (−pdt ) +
u−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
· (−rdt ) = −u, if u ≥ p
d
t
uaβ(0, t) = rt = −u, if u < p
d
t
Combining this with observations (i) and (ii) gives uaβ(z, t) = −u ≥ −u
d(z, i) = uaβ(z, i) for all i 6= t,
so t ∈ BRβ(z).
Second, for all i ∈ T such that zi > 0, the fact that u
d(z, i) = u ≤ ud(c, i) implies zi ≤ ci. Thus,∑
i∈T zi ≤
∑
i∈T ci ≤ m, so z ∈ C.
Now that z ∈ C and t ∈ BRβ(z), suppose towards a contradiction that (3a) is not satisfied, i.e.,
ud(z′, t′) > ud(z, t) for some z′ ∈ C, t′ ∈ BRβ(z
′). We have, for all i 6= t,
ud(z′, i) = −uaβ(z
′, i) ≥ −uaβ(z
′, t′) = ud(z′, t′) > ud(z, t) ≥ min
i∈T
ud(z, i) = u, (4)
where the second (in)equality is due to the fact that t′ ∈ BRβ(z
′). In addition, if pdt ≤ u, then by
definition, rt = −p
d
t and hence, u
d(z′, t) = −uaβ(z
′, t), in which case (4) holds also for i = t; if pdt > u,
then trivially ud(z′, t) = z′t · r
d
t + (1 − z
′
t) · p
d
t ≥ p
d
t > u, so (4) holds for i = t as well. Hence,
ud(z′, i) > u holds for all i ∈ T . We have mini∈T u
d(z′, i) > u = maxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i), which is a
contradiction given that z′ ∈ C.
Optimality Suppose that (β, z, t) is not optimal, i.e., there exists a feasible solution (β′, z′, t′) such
that uaθ(z
′, t′) > uaθ(z, t). Given that t ∈ BRθ(z), we have u
a
θ(z, t) ≥ u
a
θ(z, t
′), and in turn uaθ(z
′, t′) >
uaθ(z, t) ≥ u
a
θ(z, t
′), which implies z′t′ < zt′ by monotonicity of u
a
θ(·, t
′); further, z′t′ < zt′ =
u−pd
t′
rd
t′
−pd
t′
since it is defined zt′ = max
{
0,
u−pd
t′
rd
t′
−pd
t′
}
. Substituting this into the defender’s utility function gives
ud(z′, t′) < ud
(
u− pdt′
rdt′ − p
d
t′
, t′
)
=
u− pdt′
rdt′ − p
d
t′
· rdi +
(
1−
u− pdt′
rdt′ − p
d
t′
)
· pdi
= u = max
c∈C
min
i∈T
ud(c, i) ≤ max
c∈C,i∈BRβ(c)
ud(c, i).
Thus, (β′, z′, t′) violates (3a), contradicting the assumption that (β′, z′, t′) is a feasible solution.
Theorem 3 can be further strengthened under the assumption that a defender maximin strategy c is
fully mixed, i.e., 0 < ci < 1 for all i ∈ T .
2 The assumption is mild as it is normally expected that no
target would be too valueless to the extent that the defender would leave it wide open for the attacker to
attack, while on the other hand, resources are normally insufficient to allow targets to be fully protected.
The strengthening is two-fold: under this assumption, (i) the defender’s only SSE strategy induced by
the attacker’s optimal report is her maximin strategy, so the equilibrium selection issue that arises when
a report can induce multiple defender SSE strategies is avoided; (ii) in particular, one optimal reporting
strategy of the attacker is a type that makes the game zero-sum, so the result holds even for a more strict
specification of Θ (e.g., when the defender has a more precise prior knowledge about possible types of
the attacker) as long as it contains the zero-sum attacker type (indeed, it is very natural for an attacker
to be a zero-sum type given the adversarial nature of security games). We state the result in Theorem 4;
the proof can be found in the appendix.
2In this case the maximin strategy is also unique; see Lemma A-4 in the appendix.
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Theorem 4. Suppose a maximin strategy c of the defender is fully mixed, i.e., 0 < ci < 1 for all
i ∈ T . Let (β, z, t) be an arbitrary optimal solution of Program (3). Then for every SSE (cˆ, iˆ) ∈
argmax
c∈C,i∈BRβ(c) u
d(c, i) on type β, it holds that cˆ = c. In addition, there exists an optimal solution
(β′, z′, t′) such that β′ = (−pd,−rd).
4 Handling Manipulations — a New Playbook and the Challenges
We have seen the consequence of attacker manipulations. Now we explore ways to handle them.
Recall our analysis above. The key to the success of the attacker’s trick is the naive playbook the
defender follows — play the learned optimal commitment as is. It appears that the defender can be
more strategic. Consider Example 2. Suppose the defender tweaks her strategy slightly, playing instead
c˜ = (1/2, 49/100) even when she learns that (1/2, 1/2) is the optimal commitment, the attacker, who
imitates a type β that makes the game zero-sum, would then have to attack B as now the best response
set of β is BRβ(c˜) = {B}. Consequently, the attacker can only obtain utility 1/2, which is even lower
than his utility 3/4 in the truthful situation. Thus, if the defender announces that she will play, e.g.,
(c1, c2 −
1
100) whenever she learns that (c1, c2) is the optimal commitment, the attacker will at least
lose the incentive to deceive the defender that playing the maximin strategy is optimal. The question
then becomes: what is the best the defender can achieve by revising her playbook in similar ways? We
formalize this approach as a commitment to a policy and analyse the challenges toward answering this
question next.
4.1 Commitment to a Policy
Formally, a policy is a function π : Θ → C × T that maps a reported attacker type to an outcome
(c, i) ∈ C × T . An outcome (c, i) is a strategy profile consisting of a defender strategy c and a best
response i ∈ BRθ(c) of the reported attacker type θ.
3 As an example, the way the defender plays when
she ignores attacker manipulation can itself be viewed as a policy, which maps every reported attacker
type θ to an SSE on θ; we will refer to this policy as the SSE policy.
A defender policy can be observed or learned by the attacker through constant interaction with the
defender. In response to a policy, a strategic attacker of true type θ then chooses to report the optimal
type β∗ ∈ argmaxβ∈Θ u
a
θ(π(β)) that will maximize his utility in the realization stage of the game. At a
higher level, this can be seen as a Stackelberg game in which the defender commits to a policy and the
attacker reports optimally in response to this policy.
To find the optimal policy we face the following challenges. First, what is a good measure of the
quality of a policy? When there is no prior information about the attacker’s type, worst-case analysis
seems to be appropriate. However, as Proposition 5 suggests, taking the worst-case defender utility as
the measure leaves us little room for improvement: the SSE policy already achieves the best worst-
case utility when Θ contains the zero-sum attacker type (intuitively, no policy can obtain more than
the maximin utility on such an attacker type). For this reason, we propose an alternative measurement
termed the efficiency of policy (EoP).
As in Definition 6, the EoP compares the actual utility the defender obtains on each attacker type
with what the defender should have obtained in an SSE had the attacker been truthful. A higher value of
EoP indicates less impact of attacker manipulation on the defender’s utility and the value of EoP always
lies in between 0 and 1 according to Proposition 7. Without loss of generality, we will hereafter assume
Θ — previously defined as the set of types the attacker is allowed to report — to also be the set of the
attacker’s possible true types, which is the common knowledge of both the defender and the attacker.
3The reason that we also specify an attacker response in the output of a policy is to avoid complication caused by the
tie-breaking issue. Same as in an SSE, the defender can implicitly induce the attacker to respond in a specific way through an
infinitesimal deviation.
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Proposition 5. Let c be the defender’s maximin strategy, and u = mini∈T u
d(c, i) be the corresponding
maximin utility. For any policy π, let γ ∈ Θ be the optimal reporting strategy of an attacker of true type
β = (−pd,−rd), i.e., γ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ u
a
β(π(θ)). It holds that u
d(π(γ)) ≤ u.
Proof. Let (z, j) = π(β), i.e., the outcome a type-β attacker would get if he reports truthfully. By
definition, we have j ∈ BRβ(z). The defender’s maximin strategy is exactly her SSE strategy in a
zero-sum game, and (c, i) forms an SSE for any i ∈ BRβ(c) (see Lemma A-2 in the appendix). Thus,
ud(z, j) ≤ max
c∈C,i∈BRβ(c) =≤ u
d(c, i). Since β makes the game zero-sum, we have
uaβ(z, j) = −u
d(z, j) ≥ −ud(c, i) = uaβ(c, i) = max
t∈T
uaβ(c, t) = −min
t∈T
ud(c, t) = −u.
Therefore, suppose towards a contradiction that ud(π(γ)) > u. We would have
uaβ(π(γ)) = −u
d(π(γ)) < −u ≤ uaβ(z, j) = u
a
β(π(β)),
which implies that the attacker would be strictly better-off reporting β and contradicts the assumption
that γ is an optimal reporting strategy of a type-β attacker.
Definition 6 (Efficiency of policy (EoP)). Let the defender’s payoff parameters be normalized to be in
[0, 1]. For each θ ∈ Θ, let βπθ = argmaxβ∈Θ u
a
θ(π(β)) be the attacker’s optimal reporting strategy in
response to a policy π (let ties be broken in favor of the defender). The efficiency of π on attacker type
θ is eopθ(π) =
ud(π(βπ
θ
))
uˆ(θ) , where uˆ(θ) = maxc∈C,i∈BRθ(c) u
d(c, i) is the defender’s utility in an SSE on
type θ. The (overall) efficiency of π is EoP(π) = minθ∈Θ eopθ(π).
Proposition 7. For any feasible defender policy π, it holds that EoP(π) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Clearly, EoP(π) ≥ 0 as the payoffs are normalized to be in [0, 1]. We show that EoP(π) ≤ 1.
Let γ be the best reporting strategy of a type-β attacker in response to π. For the outcome (c, i) =
π(γ) to be feasible, we must have i ∈ BRγ(c); thus,
ud(π(γ)) = ud(c, i) ≤ max
c∈C,i∈BRγ(c)
ud(c, i) = uˆ(γ) ≤ uˆ(β)
(same as in Definition 6, uˆ(θ) = max
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c) u
d(c, i) denotes the defender’s utility in an SSE on
attacker type θ). It follows that
EoP(π) = min
θ∈Θ
eopθ(π) ≤ eopβ(π) =
ud(π(γ))
uˆ(β)
≤
uˆ(γ)
uˆ(β)
≤ 1.
Another challenge for us is the representation of the defender policy, which is a functional variable
in the optimization problem. For a computationally feasible formulation, we follow a standard modeling
approach in the literature and consider a discrete version of the problem where the type set Θ is finite.
This approach has been widely adopted to model Bayesian games (e.g., [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006;
Paruchuri et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2009]). A finite type set can be seen as an approx-
imation to the continuous type space, while in some scenarios attacker types might also be discrete by
nature. For example, in defense against poaching, payoffs of the attacker (poachers) may depend on the
type of animal products they are interested in, which falls in a finite set. In addition to this standard
approach, we also propose a heuristic policy inspired by the quantal response model, which applies to
an infinite or even unknown type set. We present these approaches in the next two sections.
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Algorithm 1: Decide if there exists a policy π such that EoP(π) ≥ ξ.
1. For each θ ∈ Θ, compute an SSE (cˆθ, iˆθ) on type θ. Let uˆ(θ)← ud(cˆθ, iˆθ).
2. Sort attacker types in Θ by uˆ(θ), so that uˆ(θ1) ≥ uˆ(θ2) · · · ≥ uˆ(θλ).
3. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ, set (zθℓ , tθℓ) as follows:
• Let hθℓi ← max
{
0,
ξ·uˆ(θℓ)−p
d
i
rdi−p
d
i
, maxθ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθi
pθi−r
θ
i
}
for all i ∈ T .
• Let zθℓi ← min{cˆ
θℓ , hθℓi }, and t
θℓ ← BRθℓ(h
θℓ).
4. Let π ← (zθ, tθ)θ∈Θ. If EoP(π) ≥ ξ, return yes; otherwise, return no.
5 Optimal Policy for Finite Attacker Types
For a finite set of attacker types, a defender policy is simply a list of λ = |Θ| outcomes; we will therefore
also write a policy as π = (cθ, iθ)θ∈Θ, meaning that π(θ) = (c
θ, iθ) for each θ ∈ Θ. Our analysis reveals
that the problem of optimizing the EoP is NP-hard in general Stackelberg games (see Section A.4 of the
appendix), but thanks to the special game structure, the problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm
when the underlying game is a security game.
5.1 A Polynomial-time Algorithm
We consider the decision version of the optimization problem: for a given value ξ, decide whether any
defender policy π achieves EoP(π) ≥ ξ. Trivially, once we have an efficient algorithm for this decision
problem, the best EoP can be found efficiently using binary search (particularly, we already know that
the value always lies in [0, 1]). Our algorithm for this decision problem, presented as Algorithm 1, is
constructive and yields a satisfying policy when there exists one. In the remainder of this section, we
will let Θ = {θ1, . . . , θλ} such that θ1, . . . , θλ are ordered by the SSE utility they offer the defender in
the truthful setting, i.e., uˆ(θ1) ≥ uˆ(θ2) · · · ≥ uˆ(θλ); the ordered types can be obtained efficiently given
that the SSEs can be computed in polynomial time. We call a policy ℓ-compatible if truthful report is
incentivized for every attacker type θj , j ≤ ℓ; see Definition 8.
The correctness of Algorithm 1 is shown in Theorem 10, which is based on the core observation
stated in Lemma 9. Intuitively, if there exists a satisfying policy π (which we do not need to know
beforehand), we can iteratively replace the ℓ-th outcome of π and obtain a new satisfying policy π˜. The
replacement helps us pin down the ℓ-th outcome, and eventually we are able to obtain a complete policy
with the desired EoP. For readability, we provide a proof sketch for Lemma 9; the full proof can be found
in the appendix.
Definition 8. A policy π is ℓ-compatible (0 ≤ ℓ ≤ λ), if in response to π, it is optimal for every attacker
type θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ} to report truthfully, i.e., u
a
θ(π(θ)) ≥ u
a
θ(π(β)) for all β ∈ Θ.
Lemma 9. Suppose that there exists a policy π = (cθ, iθ)θ∈Θ, EoP(π) ≥ ξ, and π is (ℓ−1)-compatible
(1 ≤ ℓ ≤ λ). Let (cˆ, iˆ) be an arbitrary SSE on attacker type θℓ. Let h be such that
hi = max
{
0,
ξ · ud(cˆ, iˆ)− pdi
rdi − p
d
i
, max
θ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
uaθ(π(θ))− r
θ
i
pθi − r
θ
i
}
for all i ∈ T.
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Let zi = min{cˆi, hi} for all i ∈ T , and t ∈ BRθℓ(h). Then the policy π˜ such that π˜(θ) ={
π(θ), if θ ∈ T \ {θℓ}
(z, t), if θ = θℓ
, is feasible and ℓ-compatible, and EoP(π˜) ≥ ξ.
Proof Sketch. In the definition of hi, the quantity
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pdi
rdi−p
d
i
ensures that, if θℓ reports truthfully, then
eopθℓ(π˜) =
ud(z,t)
ud(cˆ,ˆi)
≥ ud
(
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
, t
)/
ud(cˆ, iˆ) = ξ. In addition, maxθ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθi
pθi−r
θ
i
en-
sures that the modification of π(θ) does not give any type θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1} (who reports truthfully
in response to π) an incentive to change their report to θℓ, as zt ≥ maxθ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθt
pθt−r
θ
t
gives
uaθ(π˜(θℓ)) = u
a
θ(z, t) ≤ u
a
θ
(
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθt
pθt−r
θ
t
, t
)
= uaθ(π(θ)). It can be proven that truthful report is indeed
incentivized for type θℓ by the above specification of t. Finally, taking zi = min{cˆi, hi} guarantees the
feasibility of (z, t): a defender strategy z with zi > cˆi for all i cannot be feasible, as the contrary will
contradicts the fact that (cˆ, iˆ) is an SSE.
Theorem 10. In time polynomial inm, n, and |Θ|, Algorithm 1 either outputs a policy π with EoP(π) ≥
ξ, or decides correctly that no such policy exists. The policy generated is λ-compatible.
Proof. The algorithm runs in λ iterations and its polynomial runtime is readily seen.
Trivially, when no policy can achieve EoP ξ, we have EoP(π) < ξ in Step 4; Algorithm 1 will
decide correctly that no satisfying policy exists.
Suppose that there exists a satisfying π∗, EoP(π∗) ≥ ξ. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ, let πℓ be a policy
such that πℓ(θ) =
{
π(θ), if θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1}
π∗(θ), if θ ∈ {θℓ, . . . , θλ}
; thus, πλ is exactly the policy generated by Algo-
rithm 1. Applying Lemma 9, it follows that πℓ is ℓ-compatible and EoP(πℓ) ≥ ξ for each ℓ = 1, . . . , λ;
in particular, πλ is λ-compatible and EoP(πλ) ≥ ξ. Algorithm 1 outputs πλ.
As a final remark, the policy generated by Algorithm 1 is also λ-compatible, meaning that it always
incentivizes all attacker types to report truthfully. The advantage of such a policy is that even if the
attacker may occasionally act truthfully, the quality of the policy will not be affected.
6 Beyond Finite Attacker Types
In this section, we present a heuristic approach to deal with continuous or even unknown type spaces.
The approach is inspired by the quantal response (QR) equilibrium — a concept developed to study
bounded rationality of players in a game [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995]. In a QR equilibrium, players are
assumed to play not only their optimal pure strategy, but also every other strategy with some probability.
The probability of a strategy being chosen is positively related to the utility the player gets from playing
that strategy.
6.1 QR Policy — the Rationality behind Bounded Rationality
Recall that in an SSE, the defender induces the attacker to attack a target in his best response set. In
the truthful setting, the attacker is indifferent of which exact target is chosen since all those in the best
response set offer him the best utility. In the deceptive setting, however, this is not true: the attacker only
pretends to have the equal utility over the (fake) best response set, while in fact he has to benefit from
the defender inducing him to a particular target he wants. Following this observation, the idea of the QR
policy is to penalize the attacker for reporting a fake best response set, by inducing him to attack every
target in the best response set with some probability. The QR policy is as follows.
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QR Policy. For each type θ, let cˆθ be the defender strategy in an SSE on attacker type θ. A QR policy
πQR maps a reported type θ to a distribution over outcomes in {(cˆθ, i) : i ∈ BRθ(cˆ
θ)}; the probability
σθ(i) of each outcome (cˆ
θ, i) is
σθ(i) =
exp(ϕ · ud(cˆθ, i))∑
j∈BRθ(cˆθ)
exp(ϕ · ud(cˆθ, j))
,
(i.e., the softmax function) where ϕ > 0 is a constant parameter ϕ used to adjust the rationality level of
the player: when ϕ→ 0, a player exhibits a fully non-rational behavior, playing each strategy uniformly
at random; when ϕ → +∞, a player becomes perfectly rational, choosing the optimal strategy with
probability approaching 1. We refer to the QR policy with a specific ϕ the QR-ϕ.
A defender who uses πQR then samples an outcome from the distribution πQR(θ) when θ is reported.
The players’ now consider their expected utility over the outcome distribution, e.g., for the defender:
ud(πQR(θ)) =
∑
i∈BRθ(cˆθ)
σθ(i) · u
d(cˆθ, i). The EoP is defined accordingly with the above utility
definition. Since cˆθ and σθ are independent of the type set Θ, a QR policy can be implemented on-the-
fly for the type reported, and is thus able to handle infinite or unknown type spaces.
While the QRmodel adds further randomization to the defender’s commitment, the softmax function
that defines σθ(i) strikes a balance and loosely strings the defender’s choice of induced attacker actions
to the optimal one. In some sense, this is the rationality behind behaving in such a boundedly rational
manner. We evaluate the performance of the QR policy through simulations in the next section.
6.2 Simulations
We run experiments to evaluate our approaches in randomly generated games. All results are obtained
on a platform with a 2.60 GHz CPU and a 8.0 GB memory. To generate reward and penalty parameters,
for each target, we generate a pair of numbers uniformly at random in [0, 1], and let the larger one be
the reward and the smaller one be the penalty. The payoff parameters of each attacker type are also
tuned using the well-known covariant game model [Nudelman et al., 2004] as follows. We set a control
parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], and shift each payoff parameter x towards the corresponding one y of a zero-
sum attacker type (i.e., a type that has the negative payoffs of the defender), such that after the shift x
becomes x′ = (1 − ρ) · x + ρ · y. Therefore, when ρ = 1, the game is exactly zero-sum, and when
ρ = 0, the attacker’s payoffs are completely random. Without loss of generality, all our evaluations are
conducted with a finite type set, so that when we evaluate EoP, the attacker’s optimal reporting strategy
can be computed by enumerating all the possible types. Each result shown is averaged over the results
of 50 runs.
EoP Comparison. The primary goal of the experiments is to compare the EoP achieved by our ap-
proaches, as well as that by the SSE policy (i.e., the situation when attacker manipulation is ignored) as
a benchmark. The first set of results is shown in Figure 1. Figures (a)–(c) show the variance of EoP with
respect to ρ, with type sets of different scales. Except for the QR policy with ϕ = 10, the performance
of all other approaches is very close to each other in all these figures, though there is still a clear gap be-
tween the optimal policy and the SSE policy. The next figures (d)–(f) show the variance of the EoP with
respect to the scale of the game, under different target-resource ratios. Similar patterns can be observed
from the results. In general, in these instances, the loss due to ignoring attacker manipulation appears to
be insignificant, and the improvement brought by our approaches is marginal.
A more interesting set of results are shown in Figure 2, in which we slightly tweak the randomly
generated type set, by always adding a zero-sum attacker type in it. The small change leads to a very
different pattern in the results. There is a very significant gap between the optimal and the SSE policies,
and the QR policies normally rest in between them. The results corroborate our theoretical analysis,
that all attacker types will be incentivized to report the zero-sum type when they are allowed to, which
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Figure 1: The EoP of the QR, the optimal, and the SSE policies. The fixed parameters are: n = 50,
m = 10 as in (a)–(c); and ρ = 0.5, λ = 100 as in (d)–(f).
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Figure 2: The EoP of the QR, the optimal, and the SSE policies when a zero-sum attacker type is added
in the type set. The fixed parameters are set the same way as in Figure 1: n = 50,m = 10 as in (a)–(c);
and ρ = 0.5, λ = 100 as in (d)–(f).
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undermines the performance of the SSE policy significantly. The optimal policy, however, is able to
achieve very high EoP, close to recovering the defender’s truthful utility (EoP = 1) in many results. The
QR policies are now able to provide significant improvement over the SSE policy, sometimes perform
even better than the optimal policy;4 however, the advantage collapses when there is a relatively large
number of resources as shown in (f).
Algorithm Runtime. We also test the runtime of our algorithms. The results are shown in Figure 3
below. In each result, the time for computing the SSE is excluded as this is handled by an existing algo-
rithm. Both our algorithms for computing the optimal policy and the QR policy exhibit good scalability,
capable of solving problems with 5000 attacker types and 500 targets in a reasonable amount of time.
The computation of QR policy is extremely efficient thanks to its simplicity.
(a) Optimal policy
n : 100 200 300 400 500
λ : 1000 3.54 7.45 10.65 14.26 17.96
2000 14.84 30.81 46.84 75.99 78.75
3000 32.42 63.50 96.92 126.96 161.37
4000 57.47 115.05 171.00 228.20 288.19
5000 88.84 184.77 273.51 365.91 480.54
(b) QR policy
n : 100 200 300 400 500
λ : 1000 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
2000 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10
3000 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12
4000 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16
5000 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.20
Figure 3: Algorithm runtime (seconds).
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates manipulation to algorithms for learning the opponents’ payoffs in Stackelberg
security games and aims at providing a remedy for the overoptimistic assumption of a truthful attacker
adopted by these algorithms. We build a novel game framework for this purpose, and propose exact and
heuristic approaches to reduce the loss due to manipulation in this framework. The effectiveness of our
approaches are evaluated both theoretically and empirically. We believe that our work opens a door to
future research on similar models, especially variants of Stackelberg games.
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A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Auxiliary Results
Lemma A-1. Suppose (cˆ, iˆ) ∈ argmax
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c) u
d(c, i) is an SSE on attacker type θ. The following
holds:
(i) If cˆi < 1 for all i ∈ T , then {i ∈ T : cˆi > 0} ⊆ BRθ(cˆ) and
∑
i∈T cˆi = m.
(ii) If cˆi = 1 for some i ∈ T , then there exists j ∈ BRθ(cˆ) such that cˆj = 1.
Proof. By definition, cˆ forms an SSE with some iˆ ∈ BRθ(cˆ), i.e., u
d(cˆ, iˆ) ≥ ud(c, i) for all c ∈ C, i ∈
BRθ(c). We claim that cˆ is the optimal solution to the following linear program:
maxc u
d(c, iˆ) (A-1)
s.t. uaθ(c, i) ≤ u
a
θ(c, iˆ) ∀i ∈ T \ {ˆi} (A-1a)∑
i∈T ci ≤ m (A-1b)
0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ T (A-1c)
To see this, note that, first, cˆ satisfies all the constraints above: (A-1a) is equivalent to iˆ ∈ BRθ(c),
and (A-1b) and (A-1c) combined are equivalent to c ∈ C. Thus, it is a feasible solution. Second, the
assumption that cˆ is not optimal would imply the existence of another feasible solution z 6= cˆ, such that
ud(z, iˆ) > ud(cˆ, iˆ); this contradicts the assumption that (cˆ, iˆ) forms an SSE.
By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, cˆ is an optimal solution only if there exists constants
(i.e., KKT multipliers) αi, β, γi and δi, each corresponding to an inequality constraint in (A-1a)–(A-1c),
such that for all i ∈ T (let wai = p
θ
i − r
θ
i and w
d
i = r
d
i − p
d
i for each i below):{
− wai · αi − β + γi − δi = 0 (if i 6= iˆ)
wd
iˆ
− β + γiˆ − δˆi = 0
(by stationarity5) (A-2)
αi, β, γi, δi ≥ 0 (by dual feasibility) (A-3)

αi ·
(
uaθ(cˆ, i) − u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ)
)
= 0
β ·
(∑
j∈T cˆj −m
)
= 0
γi · cˆi = 0
δi · (cˆi − 1) = 0
(by complementary slackness6) (A-4)
Now we show (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma separately.
Part (i). Since cˆi < 1 for all i ∈ T , we have δi = 0 for all i ∈ T by the last equation in (A-4). Suppose
towards a contradiction that
∑
i∈T cˆi < m. We would have β = 0 by the second equation in (A-4); and
further, by the second equation in (A-2), wd
iˆ
+ γiˆ = 0, which is a contradiction as w
d
iˆ
= rd
iˆ
− pd
iˆ
> 0
and γi ≥ 0. Thus, β > 0 and
∑
i∈T cˆi = m.
Similarly, if we suppose cˆt > 0 for some t ∈ T , but t /∈ BRθ(cˆ), we would have u
a
θ(cˆ, t) <
maxi∈T u
a
θ(cˆ, i) = u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ). Thus, γt = 0 and αt = 0 by the third and the first equations in (A-4), and
further, β + δt = 0 by the first equation in (A-2) (note that t 6= iˆ since t /∈ BRθ(cˆ)), which contradicts
β > 0 and δi = 0 for all i ∈ T as we have shown above.
5A solution x satisfies stationarity if ∇f(x) = λ1 · ∇g1(x) + · · · + λℓ · ∇gℓ(x), where f is the objective function
(minimization), each gi corresponds to an inequality constraint (in the form gi(x) ≤ 0), and each λi is a KKT multiplier.
6A solution x satisfies complementary slackness if λi · gi(x) = 0 for each KKT multiplier λi and their corresponding
inequality constraint function gi.
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Part (ii). Suppose that cˆt = 1, t ∈ T , but cˆi < 1 for all i ∈ BRθ(c) (in particular, cˆˆi < 1). Thus,
t /∈ BRθ(cˆ), so u
a
θ(cˆ, t) < maxi∈T u
a
θ(cˆ, i) = u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ). We have γt = 0 and αt = 0 by (A-4), which
implies β + δt = 0 by (A-2); thus β = 0. In addition, cˆˆi < 1 implies δˆi = 0 by (A-4). Again, by (A-2),
we end up with the contradiction that wd
iˆ
+ γiˆ = 0.
Lemma A-2. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender, i.e., c ∈ argmaxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i).
Then (c, i) forms an SSE in a zero-sum game for any i ∈ BRβ(c), where β = (−p
d,−rd).
Proof. Suppose (c, j), j ∈ BRβ(c) is not an SSE. Thus, there exists z ∈ C and t ∈ BRβ(z), such
that ud(z, t) > ud(c, j); equivalently, uaβ(z, t) < u
a
β(c, j) as β makes the game zero-sum. Since
j ∈ BRβ(c) and t ∈ BRβ(z) are the attacker’s best responses, we have u
a
β(c, j) = maxi∈T u
a
β(c, i)
and uaβ(z, t) = maxi∈T u
a
β(z, i) by definition; thus, maxi∈T u
a
β(z, i) < maxi∈T u
a
β(c, i). This leads to
the following contradiction:
max
c∈C
min
i∈T
ud(c, i) = min
i∈T
ud(c, i) = −max
i∈T
uaβ(c, i) < −max
i∈T
uaβ(z, i) = min
i∈T
ud(z, i).
Corollary A-3. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender and c is fully mixed. Then (c, i) forms
an SSE in a zero-sum game for all i ∈ T , and ud(c, i) = minj∈T u
d(c, j) for all i ∈ T .
Proof. By Lemma A-2, (c, i) forms an SSE on attacker type β = (−pd,−rd) for all i ∈ BRβ(c).
Since c is fully mixed, T = {i ∈ T : ci > 0}, and by Lemma A-1 (i), T ⊆ BRβ(c) ⊆ T . Thus,
BRβ(c) ⊆ T , so (c, i) forms an SSE on attacker type β (i.e., in a zero-sum game) for all i ∈ T ; we have
uaβ(c, i) = maxj∈T u
a
β(c, j). Further, it follows that u
d(c, i) = −uaβ(c, i) = −maxj∈T u
a
β(c, j) =
minj∈T u
d(c, j).
Lemma A-4. Suppose c is a maximin strategy of the defender and c is fully mixed, i.e., 0 < ci < 1 for
all i ∈ T . Then c is the only maximin strategy of the defender.
Proof. Suppose z = argmaxc∈C mini∈T u
d(c, i) is a maximin strategy and z 6= c. Thus, either: (i)
zi ≥ ci for all i ∈ T , and this is strictly satisfied by some i; or (ii) zj < cj for some j ∈ T . We show
either of them leads to a contradiction.
Since c is a maximin strategy, it is also an SSE defender strategy by LemmaA-2; and by LemmaA-1 (i),∑
i∈T ci = m. Thus, in the former case, it follows immediately that
∑
i∈T zi >
∑
i∈T ci = m, which
contradicts z ∈ C. In the latter case, we have ud(z, j) < ud(c, j) by monotonicity of ud(·, j), which
implies mini∈T u
d(z, i) ≤ ud(z, j) < ud(c, j) = mini∈T u
d(c, i), where the last equality follows by
Corollary A-3. This contradicts the assumption that z is a maximin strategy.
Lemma A-5. Let (cˆ, iˆ) ∈ argmax
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c) u
d(c, i) be an arbitrary SSE on an attacker type θ ∈ Θ.
For any policy π, truthful report guarantees a type-θ attacker his SSE utility, i.e., uaθ(π(θ)) ≥ u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ).
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that uaθ(π(θ)) < u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ). Let π(θ) = (z, t). For π to be
feasible, t must be a best response of a type-θ attacker to z. Thus, uaθ(z, t) ≥ u
a
θ(z, i) for all i ∈ T ;
in particular, uaθ(z, t) ≥ u
a
θ(z, iˆ). We have u
a
θ(cˆ, iˆ) > u
a
θ(π(θ)) = u
a
θ(z, t) ≥ u
a
θ(z, iˆ); since u
a
θ(·, iˆ)
changes continuously with the coverage of target iˆ, this implies the existence of a number ϕ ∈ (cˆˆi, ziˆ],
such that uaθ(ϕ, iˆ) = u
a
θ(z, t).
Consider a defender strategy z′ with z′
iˆ
= ϕ and z′i = zi for all i ∈ T \ {ˆi}. We have
∑
i∈T z
′
i ≤∑
i∈T zi ≤ m, so z
′ ∈ C. In addition, uaθ(z, i) = u
a
θ(z
′, i) for all i ∈ T \ {ˆi}. Thus,
uaθ(z
′, iˆ) = uaθ(ϕ, iˆ) = u
a(z, t) ≥ uaθ(z, i) = u
a
θ(z
′, i),
i.e., uaθ(z
′, iˆ) ≥ uaθ(z
′, i), for all i ∈ T \ {ˆi}, so iˆ ∈ BRθ(z
′). This leads to the following contradiction:
max
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c)
ud(c, i) ≥ ud(z′, iˆ) = ud(ϕ, iˆ) > ud(cˆ, iˆ) = max
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c)
ud(c, i),
where ud(ϕ, iˆ) > ud(cˆ, iˆ) since ϕ ∈ (cˆˆi, ziˆ].
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. In Theorem 3, we have shown the existence of an optimal solution containing a maximin strategy
of the defender. By Lemma A-4, c is the only maximin strategy if it is fully mixed. Thus, there exits
an optimal solution that contains c. We fix c in Program (3), and show that in the resultant program,
an optimal solution (β′, t′) is such that β′ = (−pd,−rd) and t′ ∈ argmaxi∈T u
a
θ(c, i). In fact, the
optimality of (β′, t′) follows directly from the definition of t′ as c is now fixed. In addition, since
the game with attacker type β′ is a zero-sum game, by Lemma A-2, (c, t′) forms an SSE on type β′.
Thus, constraint (3a) is satisfied, and (β′, t′) is feasible. Therefore, (β′, c, t′) is an optimal solution to
Program (3).
Now we show the first part of the theorem, i.e., the uniqueness of the induced defender strategy.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists an SSE (cˆ, iˆ) ∈ argmax
c∈C,i∈BRβ(c) u
d(c, i), such that
cˆ 6= c. Consider the two possibilities.
Case (i). cˆi ≤ ci for all i ∈ T , and this is strictly satisfied for some i. It follows that
∑
i∈T cˆi <∑
i∈T ci ≤ m, which contradicts Lemma A-1 (i).
Case (ii). cˆi∗ > ci∗ for some i
∗ ∈ T . If it is also the case that cˆi < 1 for all i ∈ T , by Lemma A-1 (i),
we have i∗ ∈ BRβ(cˆ); If otherwise cˆi = 1 for some i ∈ T , by Lemma A-1 (ii), there exists i
† ∈ BRβ(cˆ)
such that cˆi† = 1 > ci† . In both cases, we find some i
† ∈ BRβ(cˆ) such that cˆi† > ci†; hence,
ud(cˆ, i†) > ud(c, i†) by monotonicity of ud(·, i†). We have
ud(cˆ, iˆ) = max
i∈BRβ(cˆ)
ud(cˆ, i) ≥ ud(cˆ, i†) > ud(c, i†) = ud(c, iˆ),
where the last equality follows by Corollary A-3. Thus, by the monotonicity of ud(·, iˆ), we have cˆˆ
i
> c
iˆ
.
From the attacker’s perspective, we then have uaθ(cˆ, iˆ) < u
a
θ(c, iˆ) ≤ maxi∈T u
a
θ(c, i) = u
a
θ(c, t
′), which
implies that (β′, c, t′) is a better solution than (β, z, t) and contradicts the assumption in the statement
of the theorem. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Let β ∈ Θ be an optimal report of a type-θℓ attacker in response to π, i.e., u
a
θℓ
(π(β)) ≥
uaθℓ(π(β
′)) for all β′ ∈ Θ. We first show a couple of key observations for the proof.
Claim 1. uaθℓ(h, i
β) ≥ uaθℓ(π(β)).
Suppose by a contradiction that uaθℓ(h, i
β) < uaθℓ(π(β)) = u
a
θℓ
(cβ , iβ). By monotonicity of uaθℓ(·, i
β),
we have cβ
iβ
< hiβ = max
{
0,
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pd
iβ
rd
iβ
−pd
iβ
, maxθ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθ
iβ
pθ
iβ
−rθ
iβ
}
. Since cβ
iβ
≥ 0, we have
hiβ > 0, so either c
β
iβ
< hiβ =
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pd
iβ
rd
iβ
−pd
iβ
, or cβ
iβ
< hiβ =
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθ
iβ
pθ
iβ
−rθ
iβ
for some θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1}.
We show that both of them lead to contradictions.
(i) cβ
iβ
<
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pd
iβ
rd
iβ
−pd
iβ
. It follows that ud(π(β)) = ud(cβ , iβ) < ud
(
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pd
iβ
rd
iβ
−pd
iβ
, iβ
)
= ξ · ud(cˆ, iˆ);
thus, EoP(π) ≤ eopθℓ(π) =
ud(π(β))
ud(cˆ,ˆi)
< ξ, a contradiction.
(ii) cβ
iβ
<
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθ
iβ
pθ
iβ
−rθ
iβ
for some θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1}. It follows that u
a
θ(π(β)) = u
a
θ(c
β , iβ) >
uaθ
(
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθ
iβ
pθ
iβ
−rθ
iβ
, iβ
)
= uaθ(π(θ)), so a type-θ attacker would be strictly better-off reporting type
β in response to π, contradicting the assumption that π is ℓ-compatible.
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This proofs Claim 1.
Claim 2. ht ≤ cˆt; and hence, zt = min{cˆt, ht} = ht.
It follows readily from Claim 1 that uaθℓ(h, t) = maxi∈T u
a
θℓ
(h, i) ≥ uaθℓ(h, i
β) ≥ uaθℓ(π(β)).
Further, by the definition of β, uaθℓ(π(β)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(π(θℓ)); by Lemma A-5, u
a
θℓ
(π(θℓ)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, iˆ). Com-
bining these inequalities gives uaθℓ(h, t) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, iˆ) = maxi∈T u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, i) ≥ uaθℓ(cˆ, t). By monotonicity
of uaθℓ(·, t), we have ht ≤ cˆt. Claim 2 is proven.
Next, we show the following parts to complete this proof: (i) (z, t) is indeed feasible as an outcome
prescribed for report θℓ, i.e., z ∈ C and t ∈ BRθℓ(z). (ii) π˜ is ℓ-compatible. (iii) EoP(π˜) ≥ ξ.
Part (i). First, we have zi = min{cˆi, hi} ≤ cˆi for all i ∈ T , so 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈T zi ≤
∑
i∈T cˆi ≤
m. Thus, z ∈ C.
To see that t ∈ BRθℓ(z), suppose for a contradiction that it does not hold. Thus, u
a
θℓ
(z, i∗) >
uaθℓ(z, t) for some i
∗ ∈ T . By Claim 2, zt = ht, so we have
uaθℓ(z, i
∗) > uaθℓ(z, t) = u
a
θℓ
(h, t) = max
i∈T
uaθℓ(h, i) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(h, i∗),
which implies that zi∗ < hi∗ by monotonicity of u
a
θℓ
(·, i∗). Hence, zi∗ = min{cˆi∗ , hi∗} = cˆi∗ , and
uaθℓ(cˆ, iˆ) = maxi∈T
uaθℓ(cˆ, i) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, i∗) = uaθℓ(z, i
∗) > uaθℓ(z, t).
This eventually leads to the following contradiction:
uaθℓ(z, t) = u
a
θℓ
(h, t) = max
i∈T
uaθℓ(h, i) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(h, iβ)
≥ uaθℓ(π(β)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(π(θℓ)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, iˆ) > uaθℓ(z, t),
where uaθℓ(π(θℓ)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(cˆ, iˆ) is by Lemma A-5.
Part (ii). First, we show that it is optimal for a type-θℓ attacker to report truthfully in response to π˜.
Given that uaθℓ(h, i
β) ≥ uaθℓ(π(β)) by Claim 1, we have the following for all β
′ ∈ Θ \ {θℓ}:
uaθℓ(π˜(θℓ)) = u
a
θℓ
(z, t) ≥ uaθℓ(h, t) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(h, iβ) ≥ uaθℓ(π(β)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(π(β′)) = uaθℓ(π˜(β
′)),
where the second (in)equality is due to zt = min{cˆt, ht} ≤ ht, the third is due to t = argmaxi∈T u
a
θℓ
(h, i),
the fifth is due to the assumption that β is the optimal reporting strategy of a type-θℓ attacker. There-
fore, uaθℓ(π˜(θℓ)) ≥ u
a
θℓ
(π˜(β′)) for all β′ ∈ Θ \ {θℓ}— it is optimal for a type-θℓ to report truthfully in
response to π˜.
Next, we show that it is also optimal for every type θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1} to report truthfully. By Claim
2, zt = ht ≥ maxθ∈{θ1,...,θℓ−1}
ua
θ
(π(θ))−rθt
pθt−r
θ
t
. Thus, for every type θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1}, it holds that,
uaθ(π˜(θ)) = u
a
θ(π(θ)) = u
a
θ
(
uaθ(π(θ))− r
θ
t
pθt − r
θ
t
, t
)
≥ uaθ(z, t) = u
a
θ(π˜(θℓ)). (A-5)
Since π is (ℓ− 1)-compatible, uaθ(π(θ)) ≥ u
a
θ(π(β
′)) for all β′ ∈ Θ. Thus, it holds for all β′ ∈ Θ \{θℓ}
that
uaθ(π˜(θ)) = u
a
θ(π(θ)) ≥ u
a
θ(π(β
′)) = uaθ(π˜(β
′)). (A-6)
Combing (A-5) and (A-6) gives uaθ(π˜(θ)) ≥ u
a
θ(π˜(β
′)) for all β′ ∈ Θ, i.e., it is optimal for a type-θ
attacker to report truthfully.
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Part (iii). For each θ ∈ Θ, let uˆ(θ) = max
c∈C,i∈BRθ(c) u
d(c, i) be the defender’s SSE utility on
attacker type θ.
Since we have shown that π˜ is ℓ-compatible, truthful report is incentivized for every type in {θ1, . . . , θℓ}.
For type θℓ, we have eopθℓ(π˜) =
ud(π˜(θℓ))
uˆ(θℓ)
. By Claim 2, zt = ht ≥
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
. It follows that
eopθℓ(π˜) =
ud(π˜(θℓ))
uˆ(θℓ)
=
ud(π˜(θℓ))
ud(cˆ, iˆ)
=
ud(π˜(z, t))
ud(cˆ, iˆ)
≥
ud
(
ξ·ud(cˆ,ˆi)−pdt
rdt−p
d
t
, t
)
ud(cˆ, iˆ)
=
ξ · ud(cˆ, iˆ)
ud(cˆ, iˆ)
= ξ.
For types θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θℓ−1}, given that π˜(θ) = π(θ) by definition, we have
eopθ(π˜) =
ud(π˜(θ))
uˆ(θ)
=
ud(π(θ))
uˆ(θ)
= eopθ(π) ≥ EoP(π) ≥ ξ.
For the other types θ′ ∈ {θℓ+1, . . . , θλ}, if their optimal report remains the same as under π, for
the same argument above, eopθ′(π˜) = eopθ′(π) ≥ EoP(π) ≥ ξ. Otherwise, since π˜ changes only the
outcome that π prescribes for type θℓ, the attacker’s optimal reporting strategy can only change to θℓ.
By definition, uˆ(θ′) ≤ uˆ(θℓ); we have
eopθ′(π˜) =
ud(π˜(θℓ))
uˆ(θ′)
≥
ud(π˜(θℓ))
uˆ(θℓ)
= eopθℓ(π˜) ≥ ξ.
In summary, eopθ(π˜) ≥ ξ for all θ ∈ Θ; hence, EoP(π˜) = minθ∈Θ eopθ ≥ ξ.
A.4 Complexity of Computing Optimal Leader Policy in General Stackelberg Games
We show the complexity of computing the optimal leader policy in general Stackelberg games where
the payoff parameters of each player (or player type) are given by a matrix. We let uL ∈ Rm×n denote
the leader’s payoff matrix, and uFθ ∈ R
m×n be a type-θ follower’s payoff matrix for each follower
type θ ∈ Θ, where m and n denote the numbers of the leader’s and the follower’s actions (i.e., pure
strategies), respectively. The entries ud(i, j) and uaθ(i, j) are, respectively, the utilities of the leader and
a follower of type θ, when the leader plays her i-th action and the follower his j-th action. In an SSE,
the leader plays a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆m and the follower best responds to x with a pure strategy j,
yielding leader utility uL(x, j) =
∑m
i=1 xi · u
L(i, j) and follower utility uF(x, j) =
∑m
i=1 xi · u
F(i, j).
All other definitions and notation are the same as in Section 2.
Theorem A-6. It is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a leader policy π with EoP(π) ≥ ξ in
a Stackelberg game.
Proof. The NPmembership of the problem is straightforward as for any given policy π, it can be verified
efficiently whether EoP(π) ≥ ξ. For the NP-hardness, we show a reduction from the VERTEX COVER
problem, which is well-known to be NP-complete. A vertex cover V ′ of an undirected graphG = (V,E)
is a subset of V such that (v1, v2) ∈ E if v1 ∈ V
′ or v2 ∈ V
′. An instance of the VERTEX COVER
problem is given by a graph G = (V,E) and an integer k ≤ |V |. It is a yes-instance if there exists a
vertex cover of G of size at most k.
For a VERTEX COVER instance, we construct the following game and show that the VERTEX COVER
instance is a yes-instance if and only if there exists a leader policy π with EoP(π) ≥ 1 in the constructed
game. In the game, the leader has |E|+ 1 actions {av : v ∈ V } ∪ {a0}. The follower has three actions
{1F, 2F, 3F}. The set of possible attacker types is Θ = {θ1, . . . , θk} ∪ {θe : e ∈ E} ∪ {θ0}. The payoffs
of the players are given in Figure A-1.
We first make several observations about this game.
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• The leader’s utility only depends on the follower’s action, with 3F being the most detrimental
action the leader would anyhow avoid the follower to choose, followed by 2F. 1F is the most
preferred follower action.
• In the truthful setting, the only SSE strategy of the leader against any type-θe follower (e ∈ E) is
the pure strategy a0. When a0 is played, the follower finds his best responses to be BRθs(a0) =
{3F, 1F}, so breaks the tie by playing j = 1F. As a result, the leader’s SSE utility on follower type
θe is uˆ
L(θe) = u
L(a0, 1
F) = 1.
• In the truthful setting, all leader strategies are SSE strategies on any type-θℓ follower (ℓ =
1, . . . , k). In an SSE, a type-θℓ follower always finds his best response to be 1
F, and uˆL(θℓ) = 1
as a result.
• In the truthful setting, an SSE strategy of the leader on a type-θ0 follower can be any i 6= 0. In an
SSE, the follower finds his best response set to be {3F, 2F} and breaks the tie by playing j = 2F.
As a result, uˆL(θ0) = 0.5.
Suppose that there exists a vertex cover V ′ = {v′1, . . . , v
′
k} ⊆ V of size k. The following leader
policy π achieves EoP 1.
π(θ) =


(a0, 1
F), for each θ ∈ {θe : e ∈ E};
(av′
ℓ
, 1F), for each θ = θℓ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θk};
(a1, 2
F), for θ = θ0.
Clearly, all the outcomes prescribed are feasible, so π is a feasible policy. Further, it can be verified
that when the leader applies π, the optimal reporting strategy of the follower is the following.
• For each type-θe follower (e ∈ E), it is optimal to report a type θℓ such that v
′
ℓ ∈ V
′ is an end
point of e. Such a θℓ always exists given that V
′ is a vertex cover. The leader obtains actual utility
1 on type θe; we have eopθe(π) = 1 as a result.
• For each type-θℓ follower (ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}), it is optimal to report truthfully. The leader obtains
actual utility 1 and eopθℓ(π) = 1.
• For a type-θ0 follower, it is optimal to report truthfully. The leader obtains actual utility 0.5 and
eopθ0(π) = 1.
Therefore, EoP(π) = 1.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a policy π with EoP(π) = 1. We show that there exists a
vertex cover of G of size at most k. For EoP(π) = 1, we need eopθ(π) ≥ 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, the
actual utility the leader obtains must be: at least 1 on each θe and θℓ (ℓ 6= 0), and at least 0.5 on θ0.
Now consider the reporting strategy of a type-θ0 follower in response to π; let β ∈ Θ be the type a
type-θ0 follower is incentivized to report, and let π(β) = (x
β , jβ). For the leader needs to obtain actual
utility at least 0.5 on type θ0, we need j
β ∈ {1F, 2F}. Observe that a type-θ0 follower can already get
utility 1 by reporting truthfully and responding with 2F. Thus, a type-θ0 follower would never report β
if jβ = 1F; and when jβ = 2F, he would be incentivized to report β only when xβa0 = 0.
Given this, a type-θe follower (e = (v1, v2) ∈ E) is able to obtain utility 0.9 by reporting β. Let
γ be the type a type-θe follower is incentivized to report, and π(γ) = (x
γ , jγ); we therefore have
uFθe(x
γ , jγ) ≥ 0.9. On the other hand, for the leader to obtain actual utility at least 1 on type θe, we need
jγ = 1F, in which case uFθe(x
γ , jγ) ≥ 0.9 only if xγav1 + x
γ
av2
= 1 (i.e., only the first row of the payoff
matrix of θe is chosen). Therefore, γ /∈ {θe : e ∈ E}, because this would lead to BRγ(x
γ) = {3F} 6∋ 1F
given that xγav1 + x
γ
av2
= 1. For the same reason, we also have γ 6= θ0, so the remaining possibility is
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1F 2F 3F
any i ∈ {av1 , av2} 0.9 1
a0 0.4 0.4
otherwise 0.9 1
follower type θe
(e = (v1, v2) ∈ E)
1F 2F 3F
any i 1
follower type θℓ
(ℓ = 1, . . . , k)
1F 2F 3F
a0 1
any i 6= a0 1 1
follower type θ0
1F 2F 3F
any i 1 0.5
leader
Figure A-1: Payoffs of each follower type and the leader (blank entries are all 0).
that γ = θℓ for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let π(θℓ) = (x
θℓ , jθℓ), and let ∆ℓ denote the support set of xθℓ
for each ℓ. This establishes a mapping f from each e = (v1, v2) ∈ E to an ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that
∆ℓ ⊆ {av1 , av2}. For each ℓ ∈ {f(e) : e ∈ E}, let v
′
ℓ be an arbitrary vertex in {v ∈ V : av ∈ ∆
ℓ}. The
set of vertices {v′
f(e) : e ∈ E} thus forms a vertex cover of size at most |{f(e) : e ∈ E}| ≤ k.
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